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P1 Critical PhaaS / Active Kit Push-Payment Fraud Anti-Bot Evasion Poland

MONOPOLY GUARD v3 Powers Allegro Lokalnie PhaaS — Bulletproof Hosting, XOR Anti-Bot, Serial .pl Domain Seizure Loop

A six-day-old phishing-as-a-service kit cloning Allegro Lokalnie (Poland's largest secondhand marketplace) uses a custom XOR-obfuscated bot-fingerprinting system called MONOPOLY GUARD v3 to block all scanner and analyst access. The kit runs on AS197769 (VPSDEDICATED-AS, US bulletproof) and the operator has established a serial domain registration pattern: each time NASK seizes a .pl subdomain, a new sequential one goes live within days. Predecessor domain allegrolokalnie.282119.pl is already under NASK proceeding.

allegrolokalnie.283101.pl MONOPOLY GUARD v3 XOR key=66 AS197769 VPSDEDICATED-AS 102.220.160.128 nazwa.pl registrar Push-Payment Fraud Seller Lure InPost Clone No MX / Telegram C2 NASK Seizure Evasion
Primary Domain
283101.pl
Active Subdomain
allegrolokalnie.283101.pl
Domain Age
6 days (2026-08-11)
Registrar
nazwa.pl (Poland)
IP Address
102.220.160.128
ASN
AS197769 · VPSDEDICATED-AS
Anti-Bot
MONOPOLY GUARD v3
Predecessor Status
282119.pl — NASK seized
Current Status
✓ All Domains Seized
● UPDATE — 2026-08-18
All three generations seized. As of 2026-08-18, DNS returns zero A records for allegrolokalnie.283101.pl, allegrolokalnie.282032.pl, and allegrolokalnie.282119.pl. NASK actioned the full serial registration pattern documented in this report, taking down all three generations simultaneously. The underlying server (102.220.160.128, AS197769) remains alive with HTTP 404 — the vhosts are gone, not the machine. The operator cannot reuse these domains. Fresh registration on a new .pl or alternative TLD is the expected next move.
Finding 1

Allegro Lokalnie PhaaS Clone — iPhone 8 Lure, Seller-Targeted Push-Payment Fraud

The kit is a full client-side replica of allegrolokalnie.pl, Poland's leading secondhand marketplace. It targets sellers, not buyers. The lure: a Polish Allegro user has posted a real-looking listing for an iPhone 8 128GB Space Gray and is directed to this kit via a personalized URL to "receive payment" from a purported buyer. The victim believes they are collecting money — not surrendering credentials or authorizing a charge.

Operator configuration is injected server-side into window.__ZaufaniebotOfferSettings — delivery prices in PLN, InPost locker availability, courier, and pickup options. The product title, photo carousel, and Polish breadcrumb trail are all rendered dynamically, making the page indistinguishable from a real Allegro Lokalnie offer.

// Operator-injected config object (allegrolokalnie.js, line 16) window.__ZaufaniebotOfferSettings = { deliveryPricePln: "0" // delivery price in Polish Złoty inpost: true // InPost locker delivery enabled courier: true // courier delivery enabled pickup: true // personal pickup enabled customDeliveryOptions: [] // operator can add custom options } // Account type controls seller description text window.__allegroAccountType = "przedsiębiorca" // "business" = EU consumer rights text // Redirect flow (allegrolokalnie.js, lines 123-144) Buy button clickRedirect("koszyk") // → cart page (card harvest) Contact clickRedirect("kontakt") // → "contact seller" (social eng) Login promptRedirect("login") // → credential harvest
Push-payment fraud mechanics: The seller lure ("a buyer already paid — enter your card to receive the funds") bypasses standard phishing awareness. Victims believe they are receiving money, not authorizing a charge. This technique was confirmed live in Case 010 (basicmodoralo.com) — same kit family. See Case 010 for full kill chain including balance interrogation and theft trigger.
Finding 2

MONOPOLY GUARD v3 — XOR-Obfuscated Anti-Bot with 10-Probe Fingerprinting and Beacon Exfil

The file guard.js is 24,985 bytes of XOR-obfuscated JavaScript. Decoding algorithm: b[i] = arr[i] ^ 66 ^ (i % 256) where key 66 (0x42) is the fixed XOR constant and position modulo 256 adds per-byte rotation. The decoded payload is 6,942 characters of minified JavaScript named MONOPOLY GUARD v3.

The system requires window.__MONOPOLY_GUARD__ to be injected into the page HTML by the server. This object carries G.endpoint (beacon URL) and G.blockThreshold (score cutoff for blocking). Both remain unknown without a valid victim session — the server refuses to render the HTML to non-victim IPs.

// XOR decode (guard.js → guard-decoded.js) key: 66 (0x42) algo: b[i] = arr[i] ^ 66 ^ (i % 256) input: Uint8Array, 24,985 bytes output: UTF-8 string, 6,942 chars (minified JS) // 10 fingerprint probes with weighted bot scores probeWebdriver() +45pts — navigator.webdriver / hidden webdriver property probeAutomation() +35pts — CDC token, Phantom, Nightmare, stack trace scan probeWebGL() +28pts — SwiftShader / llvmpipe / software renderer detect probeCanvas() +22pts — canvas toDataURL override check + tampering detect probePlugins() +15pts — zero plugins = headless browser signal probeLanguages() +12pts — empty navigator.languages array probeEnvironment() +12pts — UA/platform mismatch, hardware concurrency, timezone probeChrome() +8pts — chrome.app missing in real Chromium build probeHeadless() +6pts — Notification API / touch / deviceMemory checks probeConnection() +4pts — connection API / RTT === 0 detection // Beacon payload sent via navigator.sendBeacon(G.endpoint, blob) payload = { score: <0-100> // bot probability score (capped at 100) flags: ["webdriver", ...] // list of triggered signals token: djb2(outerH+colorDepth+tzOffset+hwConc) // browser fingerprint canvas: djb2(canvasDataURL) // GPU rendering fingerprint tz: "Europe/Warsaw" // victim timezone string page: "/offer/ABC123" // current page path (session ID) ts: 1723906200000 // Unix timestamp milliseconds } // Block action if score >= G.blockThreshold document.documentElement.innerHTML = ""; // wipe entire DOM location.replace("about:blank"); // purge browsing context
Analyst implication: Playwright and Puppeteer are detected by UA string ("headless" regex), navigator.webdriver flag, CDC token ($cdc_asdjflasutopfhvcZLmcfl_), stack trace scan, and SwiftShader WebGL renderer. Datacenter IPs are blocked at the HTTP layer before any JS executes. The only reachable endpoints without a valid victim-session URL are /guard.js, /allegrolokalnie.js, and /health.
Finding 3

AS197769 VPSDEDICATED-AS Bulletproof Infrastructure — Dedicated IP, No Co-hosted Domains

The kit resolves to 102.220.160.128, allocated within netblock 102.220.160.0/22 (1,024 IPs) under AS197769, operated by VPS Dedicated LLC (US-registered). The abuse contact for this ASN is abuse@vpsdedicated.net. HackerTarget reverse-IP lookup returned zero co-hosted domains — the operator is using a clean, single-purpose dedicated server with no other domains sharing the IP, eliminating standard pivot opportunities.

Cloudflare nameservers (poppy.ns.cloudflare.com, vasilii.ns.cloudflare.com) provide DNS management. The wildcard certificate *.283101.pl was issued by Let's Encrypt at 2026-08-11T10:25:00Z — 37 minutes before the domain registration timestamp (11:02:46 UTC). This pre-staged cert issuance indicates a scripted deployment pipeline: the operator automates domain registration and cert acquisition as a single workflow.

// Infrastructure summary Domain: 283101.pl Subdomain: allegrolokalnie.283101.pl Registered: 2026-08-11T11:02:46Z (6 days old at time of investigation) Registrar: nazwa.pl sp. z o.o. (Kraków, Poland) NS: poppy.ns.cloudflare.com / vasilii.ns.cloudflare.com A record: 102.220.160.128 ASN: AS197769 VPSDEDICATED-AS (VPS Dedicated LLC, US) Netblock: 102.220.160.0/22 (1024 IPs) Abuse: abuse@vpsdedicated.net Reverse IP: NO CO-HOSTED DOMAINS (HackerTarget) TLS Cert: *.283101.pl Let's Encrypt 2026-08-11T10:25:00Z ↳ issued 37 minutes BEFORE domain reg — scripted deployment MX record: NONE SPF record: NONE TXT record: NONE ↳ no email infrastructure = operator uses Telegram for C2 // Confirmed live endpoints GET /health HTTP 200 {"status":"ok"} — server alive GET /guard.js HTTP 200 24,985 bytes — anti-bot served GET /allegrolokalnie.js HTTP 200 352 lines — kit loader served GET / HTTP 404 "nie znaleziono" — non-victim blocked GET /offer/* HTTP 404 "nie znaleziono" — session required
Finding 4

Serial NASK Seizure Evasion — Operator Registers Sequential .pl Subdomains as Predecessors Are Seized

Domain research reveals a three-generation active fraud infrastructure on the same subdomain pattern and IP, with NASK (Poland's national domain registry) actively seizing earlier iterations. The operator counters each seizure by registering a new sequential .pl numeric subdomain within days, all through the same registrar (nazwa.pl) and pointing to the same server IP.

// Serial registration pattern — all via nazwa.pl sp. z o.o. (Kraków) Generation 1: allegrolokalnie.282119.pl Registered: 2026-07-24T13:02:23Z Status: DOMAIN IS UNDERGOING PROCEEDING ← NASK seizure active Seized: 2026-07-27T09:44:25Z (3 days after registration) Generation 2: allegrolokalnie.282032.pl Registered: [earlier, same period] IP: 102.220.160.128 ← SAME server as Gen 3 Status: ACTIVE ← still live at time of investigation Generation 3: allegrolokalnie.283101.pl ← THIS CASE Registered: 2026-08-11T11:02:46Z IP: 102.220.160.128 Status: ACTIVE — 6 days old // Pattern analysis Numbers: 282032 → 282119 → 283101 (ascending sequential) All via: nazwa.pl (same registrar, same abuse channel) All IP: 102.220.160.128 (same dedicated server, never rotated) Tactic: register → deploy → wait for seizure → repeat
Attribution note: The fixed server IP across all three generations, combined with the same registrar account at nazwa.pl, provides a strong infrastructure fingerprint. CERT.pl and NASK already have Generation 1 in proceedings — they are aware of this operator. Reporting Generation 3 to NASK and CERT.pl with this serial pattern documentation should accelerate seizure.
Finding 5

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and Operational Security Profile

The operator runs a professionally structured fraud operation with deliberate OPSEC choices at each layer: scripted infrastructure deployment, anti-bot obfuscation with custom XOR encoding, victim-session gating, bulletproof offshore hosting, and Telegram-based C2 (inferred from zero MX records). The combination of MONOPOLY GUARD v3 and per-victim URL assignment makes both automated scanning and manual probing from non-victim IPs impossible.

// MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise mapping T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains Serial .pl registration via nazwa.pl, new domain per seizure cycle T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location allegrolokalnie.NNN.pl mimics allegrolokalnie.pl (official domain) T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information XOR(key=66, pos%256) encoding on guard.js anti-bot payload T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture Full Allegro Lokalnie UI clone captures card/credential input T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols sendBeacon(G.endpoint) exfils fingerprint data over HTTPS T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery MONOPOLY GUARD probes WebGL, canvas, plugins, webdriver to detect AV/analyst tools T1497.003 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time-Based Evasion requestAnimationFrame timing and RUN_DELAY=150ms to avoid instant-exec sandboxes // OPSEC profile Hosting: AS197769 VPSDEDICATED-AS (US bulletproof) — no prior EU takedowns Registration: nazwa.pl (Polish registrar) — NASK jurisdiction for .pl TLD Cert: Let's Encrypt wildcard (free, no identity verification) Obfuscation: Custom XOR (not a known commercial packer — likely in-house tool) C2 comms: No MX/SPF/TXT — Telegram inference (matches Case 010 pattern) Evasion: Per-victim session URLs, datacenter IP blocking, JS fingerprint gate
This kit shares the same push-payment seller-lure model as Case 010 (basicmodoralo.com). Both target Polish Allegro Lokalnie sellers, both use InPost delivery spoofing, and both have no email infrastructure. MONOPOLY GUARD v3 is a newer or updated protection layer — Case 010 used Cloudflare Bot Management. The upgrade suggests the operator responded to the Case 010 takedown by moving to self-hosted anti-bot.

Reporting Targets

CERT.pl (CERT Polska) cert@cert.pl Active PhaaS targeting Polish Allegro Lokalnie users — generation 3 of serial campaign, predecessor 282119.pl already in NASK proceedings
NASK (Polish Registry) nask@nask.pl .pl domain 283101.pl used for fraud — serial pattern documented (282119, 282032, 283101), all via nazwa.pl registrar, same IP 102.220.160.128
Allegro Security security@allegro.pl Brand impersonation: full allegrolokalnie.pl clone targeting sellers with push-payment fraud
Cloudflare Abuse abuse@cloudflare.com Domain 283101.pl uses Cloudflare NS for DNS management while hosting fraud infrastructure
VPSDEDICATED-AS abuse@vpsdedicated.net IP 102.220.160.128 (AS197769) hosting active PhaaS fraud server — request immediate suspension
EC3 / Europol ec3@europol.europa.eu Cross-border phishing operation targeting Polish consumers from US bulletproof infrastructure, linked to Case 010 operator
CCB Belgium suspicious@safeonweb.be Fraud report from Belgium-based OSINT researcher — active PhaaS targeting EU marketplace users
Investigation Methodology
Phase 1 — Target Identification
Target surfaced via scam_hunter.py autonomous feed analysis (URLhaus + PhishTank + DDG EU dorks). Score: 0.70. Domain age: 6 days. Initial HTTP probe confirmed server alive at allegrolokalnie.283101.pl. /health endpoint returned HTTP 200 {"status":"ok"}.
Phase 2 — DNS, WHOIS, and ASN Attribution
WHOIS on 283101.pl revealed registration 2026-08-11 via nazwa.pl (Kraków, Poland). Cloudflare NS delegation. A record: 102.220.160.128. ASN lookup: AS197769 VPSDEDICATED-AS (VPS Dedicated LLC, US). HackerTarget reverse-IP: zero co-hosted domains. MX/SPF/TXT DNS records: all absent — Telegram C2 inference.
Phase 3 — Certificate Transparency
crt.sh query for 283101.pl returned wildcard cert *.283101.pl issued Let's Encrypt 2026-08-11T10:25:00Z — 37 minutes before domain registration. Confirms scripted, automated deployment pipeline. Subdomain allegrolokalnie.283101.pl covered by wildcard.
Phase 4 — JS Static Analysis
Downloaded guard.js (24,985 bytes) and allegrolokalnie.js (352 lines) from live server. Static analysis only — no execution. XOR decode of guard.js with key=66 and position modulo 256 revealed MONOPOLY GUARD v3 in full. allegrolokalnie.js analyzed to extract operator config object, redirect chain, and brand impersonation scope.
Phase 5 — Sister Domain Discovery
WHOIS on adjacent numeric .pl domains revealed allegrolokalnie.282119.pl (registered 2026-07-24, now under NASK proceeding) and allegrolokalnie.282032.pl (same IP, active). Serial registration pattern documented. All three generations use nazwa.pl as registrar and share the same dedicated server.
Phase 6 — Playwright Live Capture
Playwright headless Chromium (Polish mobile UA, pl-PL locale) attempted to capture the live kit page. Main page returned HTTP 404 "nie znaleziono" — confirmed bot-gate active for datacenter IPs. /health endpoint captured successfully (HTTP 200), proving server is live and the 404 is deliberate access control, not downtime.

IOC Table

TypeIndicatorNotes
DOMAIN283101.plPrimary domain — registered 2026-08-11, nazwa.pl registrar
DOMAINallegrolokalnie.283101.plActive PhaaS subdomain — Allegro Lokalnie clone
DOMAINallegrolokalnie.282032.plSister domain — same IP, active (Generation 2)
DOMAINallegrolokalnie.282119.plPredecessor — under NASK seizure proceeding (Generation 1)
IP102.220.160.128Dedicated server — all three generations, AS197769
ASNAS197769VPSDEDICATED-AS — VPS Dedicated LLC (US), netblock 102.220.160.0/22
PATH/guard.jsMONOPOLY GUARD v3 — 24,985 bytes XOR(key=66,pos%256) obfuscated
PATH/allegrolokalnie.jsKit loader — 352 lines, Allegro Lokalnie UI clone
PATH/healthLive server probe — HTTP 200 {"status":"ok"}
JSwindow.__ZaufaniebotOfferSettingsOperator config injection — delivery options, pricing in PLN
JSwindow.__MONOPOLY_GUARD__Runtime config — carries G.endpoint and G.blockThreshold (server-injected)
JSnavigator.sendBeacon(G.endpoint, blob)Bot fingerprint exfil — payload: score, flags, token, canvas, tz, page, ts
CERT*.283101.pl (Let's Encrypt)Wildcard TLS — issued 2026-08-11T10:25Z (37min before domain registration)
EMAILabuse@vpsdedicated.netASN abuse contact — VPSDEDICATED-AS (AS197769)

Evidence: MONOPOLY GUARD v3 Decoded Analysis

MONOPOLY GUARD v3 XOR decode analysis showing algorithm, 10 probe functions, beacon payload, and block action
guard.js decoded — XOR(key=66,pos%256) · 10-probe fingerprint suite · sendBeacon exfil payload ● STATIC ANALYSIS

Evidence: Infrastructure Attribution

Infrastructure analysis: WHOIS, ASN, reverse IP, wildcard cert timeline, serial domain pattern
WHOIS · ASN197769 · crt.sh wildcard cert · HackerTarget reverse IP · serial registration pattern ● PASSIVE OSINT

Live Web Capture — Bot-Gate Active (Datacenter IP Blocked)

Playwright headless capture showing HTTP 404 nie znaleziono response — kit blocks datacenter IPs
Playwright headless · Polish mobile UA · pl-PL locale · HTTP 404 "nie znaleziono" — MONOPOLY GUARD active ● BOT-GATE ACTIVE

Live Web Capture — Server Alive Proof (/health Endpoint)

Playwright capture of /health endpoint returning HTTP 200 status ok — server confirmed live
Playwright headless · /health · HTTP 200 · {"status":"ok"} — server confirmed operational ● LIVE AT CAPTURE

Live IOC Status

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