OSINT Portfolio / Case 001
Active Threat · Malware Distribution

Case 001: Amadey Botnet Dropper

Active malware distribution server at 91.92.242.236 (OMEGATECH bulletproof hosting, AS202412). Freshly compiled PE32+ injection module with zero AV detections at time of discovery. Full static analysis, IOC extraction, and infrastructure attribution.

Date: 2026-08-16 Analyst: Sergiu Vincze (SevinHub) Method: Passive OSINT + Static Analysis Severity: P1 Critical
All Cases
Case 001 of 002 Next Case
Target IP91.92.242.236
ASNAS202412 · OMEGATECH
CountrySeychelles (shell company)
Malware FamilyAmadey Botnet
VirusTotal0/72 detections
Server StatusAlive · Binary 404
● UPDATE — 2026-08-18 · Confirmed Takedown

Payload confirmed offline. /sava/build2_sava.exe returns HTTP 404. Root path also 404. Server 91.92.242.236 remains reachable (ICMP live, ~125ms) but all malicious content removed — open directory listing gone. Amadey dropper distribution endpoint neutralised. Victim machines can no longer pull the binary from this infrastructure.

On 2026-08-16 at approximately 12:40 UTC, a freshly compiled PE32+ Windows binary was discovered actively served from IP address 91.92.242.236 — hosted on bulletproof hosting provider OMEGATECH LTD (AS202412, Seychelles). The binary is a module of the Amadey botnet, a commercially available pay-per-install malware dropper widely used to distribute ransomware, information stealers, and banking trojans.

The sample was compiled only minutes before discovery, which explains why it registered zero detections on VirusTotal (0/72 AV engines). This is a deliberate evasion tactic: fresh compilation bypasses all signature-based detection. The server runs nginx/1.24.0 on Ubuntu with a completely open directory listing, serving the binary with no authentication and no rate limiting.

OMEGATECH LTD is a documented bulletproof hosting provider known to host 67+ command-and-control servers across 16 malware families. They operate as a Seychelles shell company with the real operation in Turkey (MGN TEKNOLOJI). Their upstream transit is Pfcloud UG and aurologic GmbH, both registered in Germany.

Zero AV Detections is the Attack: The Amadey operators compile a fresh binary immediately before distribution. By the time security researchers discover it and submit the hash to VirusTotal, victim machines may already be compromised. Behavioral AV or EDR would catch this — signature-only AV sees nothing.
Raw HTTP response captured from the malware server during passive investigation. Open directory listing with the malware binary directly accessible:
$ curl -sI http://91.92.242.236/ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.24.0 (Ubuntu) Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Connection: keep-alive ; Open directory — no authentication, no rate limiting $ curl -s http://91.92.242.236/ | grep "bin" client64.bin 219136 bytes 2026-08-16 12:40 UTC $ sha256sum client64.bin 0d581dac21e6140f342a435a92a52e372cea57bfb75cf41cc135b8ff39b875fd $ file client64.bin client64.bin: PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows $ objdump -x client64.bin | grep "InjectApc\|InjectNormal" InjectApcRoutine 0x0000000140001000 InjectNormalRoutine 0x0000000140001200
File: client64.bin Type: PE32+ EXE x86-64 (GUI) Size: 219,136 bytes (214 KB) Compiled: 2026-08-16 12:40 UTC Entropy: 6.84 (obfuscated sections)
SHA-256
0d581dac21e6140f342a435a92a52e372cea57bfb75cf41cc135b8ff39b875fd
MD5
0d93141625dda947333cdad23f13b619

Exported Functions (Injection Interface):

InjectApcRoutine ; APC injection — queues shellcode execution via NtQueueApcThread into a victim process ; Bypasses some endpoint monitoring by hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call queue InjectNormalRoutine ; Classic injection — VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread ; The dropper picks which routine to use based on target process and privilege level

Win32 API Import Map — What This Binary Can Do:

; === Code injection primitives === VirtualAllocEx ; allocate memory region inside remote (victim) process WriteProcessMemory ; copy shellcode/payload into that allocated region CreateRemoteThread ; start execution thread inside victim process NtWriteVirtualMemory ; NT syscall variant — harder to hook by AV/EDR NtQueueApcThread ; APC-based injection — runs code when victim thread enters alertable wait OpenProcess ; attach handle to target process ; === Privilege escalation === AdjustTokenPrivileges ; request SeDebugPrivilege to inject into protected processes ; === Network / download (next-stage payloads) === URLDownloadToFileA ; download secondary malware from C2 server WinHttpOpen ; HTTP client for C2 communication InternetOpenUrlA ; alternate download path ; === Persistence === RegSetValueExA ; write startup entry to HKCU\Software\...\CurrentVersion\Run WinExec ; execute downloaded secondary payload CreateProcessA ; spawn child processes (payload launchers) ; === Anti-analysis / sandbox evasion === IsDebuggerPresent ; halt execution if debugger detected GetTickCount ; timing check — sandboxes often run too fast

Self-Deletion Mechanism (extracted from strings):

; After injection completes, binary writes this batch command and executes it cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1 -n 3 > nul && del /f /q "%s" ; ping introduces a 3-second delay so the binary exits before del runs ; result: the malware file disappears from disk — no forensic artifact left
IP Address
91.92.242.236
ASN
AS202412
ASN Org
OMEGATECH LTD (bulletproof hosting)
Registered Country
Seychelles — shell company
Real Operator
MGN TEKNOLOJI — Turkey
Upstream Providers
Pfcloud UG · aurologic GmbH (both Germany)
Domain Registrar
Cloudflare Inc.
Web Server
nginx/1.24.0 Ubuntu
Known C2s on AS202412
67+ documented
Known Malware Families
16 (Amadey, RedLine, Raccoon, etc.)
Bulletproof hosting explained: OMEGATECH LTD ignores or indefinitely delays abuse reports. This is their business model — they charge criminal customers a premium to operate malware C2s, botnets, and dropper servers without takedown risk. All major threat intelligence blocklists include their IP ranges. Upstream providers Pfcloud UG and aurologic GmbH have historically been slow to act on complaints forwarded by downstream customers.
T1055
Process Injection (APC + CreateRemoteThread)
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer (URLDownloadToFileA)
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys Persistence
T1070.004
File Deletion — self-destruct via cmd.exe ping loop
T1140
Deobfuscate / Decode Files
T1497
Sandbox Evasion (timing + debugger checks)
TypeValueContext
IPv491.92.242.236Active malware distribution server
ASNAS202412OMEGATECH bulletproof hosting range
SHA-2560d581dac21e6140f342a435a92a52e372cea57bfb75cf41cc135b8ff39b875fdclient64.bin — Amadey injection module
MD50d93141625dda947333cdad23f13b619client64.bin
Filenameclient64.binPE32+ x86-64 GUI, 219 KB, compiled 2026-08-16 12:40 UTC
ExportInjectApcRoutineAPC-based process injection entry point
ExportInjectNormalRoutineCreateRemoteThread injection entry point
Stringcmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1 -n 3 > nul && del /f /qSelf-deletion mechanism
Abuse Contactabuse@omegatech.scHosting provider (bulletproof — low efficacy)
Registrar Abuseregistrar-abuse@cloudflare.comDomain registrar

CERT.be — Belgian CERT (Primary Belgian Authority)

Reported to incidents@cert.be. CERT.be is the correct Belgian authority for malware infrastructure — they handle cross-border threat intel, coordinate with international CERTs, and escalate to FCCU only when a confirmed Belgian victim is identified. Submitted: full IOC list, binary hash, download URL, ASN attribution, MITRE ATT&CK mapping.

Cloudflare Abuse

Submitted to abuse@cloudflare.com. Requested suspension of malware delivery domains and IP reputation update for AS202412. Cloudflare's abuse team coordinates with upstream ASN operators for bulletproof hosting takedowns.

EC3 / Europol — European Cybercrime Centre

Reported to ec3@europol.europa.eu. AS202412 (OMEGATECH) is documented bulletproof hosting with 16+ malware families across 67+ C2 servers — a cross-border organized infrastructure report is the right EC3 scope. Submitted full IOC table and PE static analysis.

Live Evidence — Screenshot Captured 2026-08-16

Headless browser screenshot of 91.92.242.236 (C2 server) captured during investigation. The server returns a minimal response — consistent with a malware C2 that only serves specific file paths rather than a browsable index. The malware binary at /sava/build2_sava.exe was confirmed during investigation (now 404 — binary removed or rotated).

91.92.242.236 — AMADEY C2 SERVER (AS202412 OMEGATECH) ⚠ C2 SERVER
Screenshot: Amadey C2 server 91.92.242.236

Server returns minimal HTTP response — C2 servers do not serve web pages. Confirmed live malware distribution during investigation.

Live Infrastructure Status
Loading status…
All Cases Next: Case 002 — ClickFix Python RAT
SevinOS BLE Radar