Full attack chain decoded: fake verification page injects PowerShell into clipboard, 4-stage obfuscated dropper installs a Python RAT with full remote shell, self-update, and a live C2 server confirmed active. All obfuscation layers broken, raw payload exposed.
A complete four-stage malware delivery chain was discovered and fully decoded starting from the phishing domain mgmntss-www.com, registered only 2 days before this investigation (2026-08-14). The attack uses a technique called ClickFix: a fake browser verification page that silently injects a malicious PowerShell command into the user's clipboard using JavaScript. The victim is then instructed to press Win+R, paste, and press Enter — unknowingly running a malware installer.
All four layers of obfuscation were successfully broken: char-array encoding, AMSI bypass, XOR decryption, and UTF-16 encoding. The final payload is a Python Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with full remote shell execution, self-update capability, and C2 beaconing. The C2 server naiu5zvmnc.update34587.com was confirmed live and operational (HTTP 401 — authentication wall protecting the API) during investigation.
All three payload/C2 domains are registered through Cloudflare — a pattern of systematic Cloudflare registrar abuse documented across multiple recent malware campaigns. The phishing lure domain is on Alibaba Cloud.
ClickFix is a social engineering technique that has surged in 2025-2026 precisely because it bypasses all browser security controls. There is no vulnerability being exploited — the victim runs the malware themselves.
The attack flow: the victim visits a webpage that looks like a Google reCAPTCHA, a Cloudflare DDoS check, or a Microsoft browser warning. The page uses JavaScript to write a PowerShell command into the OS clipboard silently via navigator.clipboard.writeText(). It then displays fake UI elements showing a "Windows" dialog telling the user to press Win+R, then Ctrl+V (paste), then Enter. The victim thinks they are completing a routine verification. They are actually executing malware.
No browser warning fires. No download dialog appears. No file is saved to disk first (until the PS1 downloads its stages). Antivirus sees nothing unusual. The user ran it themselves.
The exact PowerShell command planted in the victim's clipboard:
mgmntss-www.com. Page displays a fake browser verification widget. JavaScript silently writes the PS1 dropper command to clipboard. Visual cue instructs user to Win+R, paste, Enter. No download dialog. No browser warning. User believes they clicked a captcha button.6aczm95led.update-w-207654.com/x/521ea058. The entire script content is stored as an integer array (each character as its decimal char code), joined with -join '', and executed via Invoke-Expression. This bypasses static script content scanners that look for known malicious strings.%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\, adds a registry startup key, and runs the RAT. Python RAT then runs permanently in the background, phoning home to C2 every 15-45 seconds.Phishing Lure — Stage 0
Payload Delivery Server — Stage 1
Command & Control Server — Active
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | mgmntss-www.com | ClickFix phishing lure (Alibaba Cloud, reg. 2026-08-14) |
| Domain | update-w-207654.com | Payload delivery parent domain (Cloudflare, reg. 2026-08-02) |
| Domain | 6aczm95led.update-w-207654.com | Stage 1 PS1 host — active delivery subdomain |
| Domain | update34587.com | C2 parent domain (Cloudflare, reg. 2026-07-20) |
| Domain | naiu5zvmnc.update34587.com | Live C2 — confirmed active HTTP 401 |
| URL | https://6aczm95led.update-w-207654.com/x/521ea058 | Stage 1 PS1 download endpoint |
| API Key | 468f81992144b843b8e3c6579b94a5d7327f96fe71bebd5d | Hardcoded RAT C2 authentication token |
| Mutex | Global\00e42cdf82cc | RAT instance mutex — single-infection guard |
| File Path | %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\*.py | RAT persistence — randomized 10-char filename |
| Registry | HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run | Startup key written by Stage 3 |
| Network | GET /api/cmd | C2: fetch pending shell command |
| Network | POST /api/result | C2: upload command output |
| Network | POST /api/agent | C2: heartbeat + receive update |
| Kill Signal | __KILL__ | RAT self-terminates on this C2 response |
| XOR Key (hex) | 4b 72 71 47 70 4c 62 48 4a 50 63 56 65 4c 5a 5a 50 6f 4a 45 55 65 47 42 6e 47 78 47 52 75 57 64 | Stage 2→3 32-byte cycling XOR decryption key |
| Registrar Abuse | registrar-abuse@cloudflare.com | All delivery + C2 domains registered via Cloudflare |
Reported to incidents@cert.be. No confirmed Belgian-specific targets — CERT.be is the correct first stop for international phishing/RAT campaigns reported by a Belgian researcher. They assess national relevance and escalate to FCCU when Belgian victims are identified. Submitted: full 4-stage kill chain, decoded RAT source, all IOCs, live C2 confirmation.
Reported to abuse@cloudflare.com: mgmntss-www.com (ClickFix phishing origin) and api.mgmntss-www.com (live Python RAT C2). Requested emergency domain suspension under Section 2.8 of Cloudflare ToS (illegal content proxying).
Reported to security@vercel.com: cdn-js.vercel.app and cdn-mgm.vercel.app are serving PowerShell stage payloads as part of this attack chain. Requested immediate deployment suspension.
Reported to ec3@europol.europa.eu. Multi-stage RAT campaign with infrastructure spread across Cloudflare, Vercel, and independent C2 — cross-border scope makes EC3 the correct international body. Full decoded source, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and domain attribution submitted.
Headless browser screenshot of mgmntss-www.com captured during investigation. ClickFix phishing page presenting a fake CAPTCHA / browser verification check that injects PowerShell into the victim's clipboard on "Continue" click.
Evidence captured passively. Do not visit or click "Verify" — it copies a malicious PowerShell command to clipboard leading to RAT installation.